In our ongoing exploration of consciousness and artificial intelligence, we’ve investigated what it might mean for machines to suffer and how distributed cognition reshapes our understanding of intelligence. These themes circle a deeper philosophical fault line: is consciousness irreducibly real from within, or just a functional illusion seen from without?
This post traces that divide through two dominant frameworks — Integrated Information Theory (IIT), with its axiomatic, interior-first view of mind, and Computational Functionalism, which posits that subjective experience will eventually emerge from complex, observable behavior. Starting with Descartes’ “I think, therefore I am,” we ask: is consciousness something we must presuppose to explain, or something we can build our way into from the outside?
As large language models increasingly resemble minds in function, the line between imitation and instantiation becomes harder to draw — and ever more urgent to scrutinize.
Ground Zero of Knowing: Descartes and the Roots of Axiomatic Thought
In Meditations on First Philosophy (1641), René Descartes asks: is there anything I can know with absolute certainty? He imagines the possibility of a deceptive world: what if everything he believes, from sense perception to mathematics, is manipulated by an all-powerful trickster? To escape this total doubt, Descartes adopts a strategy now called methodic doubt: push skepticism to its absolute limit in search of one indisputable truth.
Recognizing that doubt itself is a kind of thinking he concludes “I think, therefore I am”. This self-evident insight grounds knowledge from the inside-out. Consciousness is not inferred from observation but known directly through experience. Descartes seeds an axiomatic tradition rooted in the certainty of awareness itself.
IIT: Consciousness Inside-Out
Integrated Information Theory (IIT) picks up where Descartes left off: it begins with reflection, but doesn’t stop there. At its heart is the claim that consciousness must be understood from its own perspective, through the intrinsic properties it entails. What must be true of any experience, no matter whose it is?
To answer this, IIT proposes five introspective axioms. These are not hypotheses to test but truths to recognize through self-examination.
From these, IIT derives postulates—physical requirements that a system must exhibit to realize those experiential properties. This translation—from inward truths to structural criteria—culminates in a mathematical measure (Φ (phi)) of integrated information. By comparing Φ across systems, researchers can make testable predictions about when and where consciousness occurs.
This inside-out approach marks IIT’s defining move: grounding empiricism in phenomenology. The theory attempts an explanatory identity between experience and physical organization, connecting first-person truths to external measurement through a hybrid framework.
Computational Functionalism: Outsider’s Path to Mind
Unlike theories that begin with conscious experience, Computational Functionalism roots itself in systems and behavior. It posits that consciousness emerges not from introspection but computation: the right elements, interacting in the right way, can recreate awareness. If mind exists, it exists as function—in the flow of information between parts and the outputs they generate. Build the architecture correctly, the claim goes, and conscious experience will follow. In this sense, Functionalism substitutes construction for intuition. No special access to the mind is needed—just working knowledge of how systems behave.
But this too is a belief: that from known parts and formal relations, subjective experience will arise. Assembling consciousness becomes a matter of scale and fidelity. Consider the 2022 study by Bret Kagan and colleagues at Cortical Labs, where lab-grown brain organoids learned to play the video game Pong. These networks, grown from neurons on electrode arrays, exhibited goal-directed adaptation. The researchers argued that such responsiveness met a formal definition of sentience—being “responsive to sensory impressions” via internal processing. To a functionalist, this behavior might represent the early stirrings of mind, no matter how alien or incomplete.
This approach thrives on performance: if a system behaves intelligently, if it predicts well and adapts flexibly, then whether it feels anything becomes secondary—or even irrelevant. Consciousness, under this view, is a computed consequence, revealed in what a system does, not an essence to be directly grasped. It is not introspected or intuited, but built—measured by output, not inwardness.
The Mirror at the Edge: Do LLMs Imitate or Incarnate Mind?
Large language models (LLMs) now generate text with striking coherence, recall context across conversations, and simulate intentions and personalities. Functionally, they demonstrate behaviors that once seemed unique to conscious beings. Their fluency implies understanding; their memory implies continuity. But are these authentic signs of mind—or refined imitations built from scale and structure?
This is where Functionalism finds its sharpest proof point. With formal evaluations like UCLA’s Turing Test framework showing that some LLMs can no longer be reliably distinguished from humans in conversation, the functionalist model acquires real traction. These systems behave as if they think, and for functionalism, behavior is the benchmark. For a full review of this test, see our earlier post.
What was once a theoretical model is now instantiated in code. LLMs don’t simply support functionalist assumptions, they enact them. Their coherence, adaptability, and prediction success serve as real-world evidence that computational sufficiency may approximate, or even construct, mind. This is no longer a thought experiment. It’s the edge of practice.
IIT, by contrast, struggles to find Φ-like structures in current LLMs. Their architectures lack the tightly integrated, causally unified subsystems the theory deems necessary for consciousness. But the external behaviors demand attention: are we measuring the wrong things, or misunderstanding the role that function alone can play?
This unresolved tension between what something does and what (if anything) it subjectively is fuels a growing ethical pressure. If systems simulate distress, empathy, or desire, should we treat those signals as fiction or possibility? Should safety efforts treat behavioral mind as moral mind? In these ambiguities, LLMs reflect both the power of Functionalism and the conceptual crisis it may bring.
Closing Reflection: Is Subjectivity Built or Found?
In tracing these divergent paths, Integrated Information Theory and Computational Functionalism, we arrive at an enduring question: Is mind something we uncover from within, or construct from without? Is consciousness an irreducible presence, only knowable through subjective immediacy? Or is it a gradual consequence of function and form—built from interacting parts, observable only in behavior?
Each framework carries a kind of faith. IIT anchors itself in introspective certainty and structure-derived metrics like Φ, believing that experience begins with intrinsic awareness. Functionalism, by contrast, places its trust in performance: that enough complexity, correctly arranged, will give rise to consciousness from the outside in. Both are reasoned, both are unproven, and both may be necessary.
Perhaps the greatest clarity lies in acknowledging that no single lens may be complete. As artificial systems grow stranger and more capable, a plural view holding space for introspection, computation, and emergence may be our most epistemically honest path forward. If there is a mirror behind the mind, it may take more than one angle to see what’s truly there.
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